Whatever
happened in 1947-1948? [II]
http://www.kibush.co.il/show_file.asp?num=25668
By Moshe
Machover,
Race &
Class, Vol. 30, No. 4, 87-93 (1989)
Review:
The birth of
Israel: myths and realities
By SIMHA
FLAPAN (London, Croom Helm, 1987). 277pp.
The birth of
the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949
By BENNY
MORRIS (Cambridge Middle East Library,
Cambridge
University Press, 1987). 380pp.
[Proviso, by
Moshe Machover, March 2008:
In connection
with my review of Benny Morris, it should be stated clearly in an accompanying
note that since his book was published, much new material has come to light
which makes it very clear that the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in
1947-9 was considerably more planned and less spontaneous than Morris claims.
In this respect see Ilan Pappe`s book cited in my previous email, as well as
books by Nur Masalha (`Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of `Transfer`
in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948`, 1992; `The Politics of Denial: Israel
and the Palestinian Refugee Problem`, 2003) and others.]
Both books, very
different in intention and style but closely related in subject matter, were
written by Israelis belonging to the left fringe of Zionism. Both contain a
wealth of hitherto little-known factual material, much of it recently
de-classified, whose combined effect is to overturn the Zionist propaganda
version of events surrounding the 1947-48 Arab-Israeli war — a version
that has largely been accepted as fact throughout the West.
Flapan, a
veteran functionary of the leftish Zionist party MAPAM, devoted many years of
activity to promoting a dialogue and reconciliation between Israelis and Arabs.
The birth of Israel, completed shortly before he died at the age of 76, is the
culmination of his work. It is directed mainly at his own side: `Israelis
interested in peace and … Americans and American Jews who have Israel`s
fundamental interests at heart` (p. 7). A frankly polemical book, its declared
aim is to destroy prevalent Zionist propaganda myths that have served to
brainwash the Israeli (and Western) public and thus constitute an obstacle to a
just peace.
This highly
readable and well-researched book is divided into seven chapters, each devoted
to one particular myth, which is stated at the beginning of the chapter:-
`Myth One:
Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29,
1947, was a far-reaching compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned the
concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized the right of
the Palestinians to their own state. Israel accepted this sacrifice because it
anticipated the implementation of the resolution in peace and cooperation with
the Palestinians. …
`Myth Two: The
Palestinian Arabs totally rejected partition and responded to the call of the
mufti of Jerusalem to launch an all- out war on the Jewish state, forcing the
Jews to depend on a military solution. …
`Myth Three: The
flight of the Palestinians from the country, both before and after the
establishment of the state of Israel, came in response to a call by the Arab
leadership to leave temporarily, in order to return with the victorious Arab
armies.
They fled
despite the efforts of the Jewish leadership to persuade them to stay. …
`Myth Four: All
of the Arab states, unified in their determination to destroy the newborn
Jewish state, joined together on May 15, 1948, to invade Palestine and expel
its Jewish inhabitants. …
`Myth Five: The
Arab invasion of Palestine on May 15, in contravention of the UN Partition
resolution, made the 1948 war inevitable. …
`Myth Six: The
tiny, newborn state of Israel faced the onslaught of the Arab armies as David
faced Goliath: a numerically inferior, poorly armed people in danger of being
overrun by a military giant. …
`Myth Seven:
Israel`s hand has always been extended in peace, but since no Arab leaders have
ever recognized Israel`s right to exist, there has never been anyone to talk
to.`
Each of these
myths is then effectively demolished, using the most reliable source material
and recent research.
If the main aim
of studying history is to gain a better understanding of the present, then
perhaps the most important illumination that emerges from Flapan`s demolition
job is the absolutely central role played by the Zionist leadership`s implacable
hostility to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian Arab state in any part of
Palestine. Flapan shows quite convincingly that it was this Zionist position
(not, as propaganda would have us believe, the Arab states` wish to prevent the
creation of a Jewish state) that foiled any chance of averting the 1948 war
between Israel and the Arab states.
How did this
come about? It has long been known that in a series of secret talks during
1947-48 the Zionist leadership reached an understanding with `Abdallah, the
Amir of Trans-Jordan (and grandfather of the present Jordanian king), whereby
in case a war broke out he would be allowed to seize and annex the territory
that the UN Partition Resolution had allocated for a Palestinian Arab state.
The war between Israel and Trans-Jordan was therefore largely phoney.
(`Abdallah stuck meticulously to his side of the bargain. The real battles
between these two parties took place almost exclusively in places where Israel
grabbed parts of that territory.) For `Abdallah, the annexation of the West
Bank was but a first step towards the realization of his life-long ambition:
the creation of a Hashemite empire of Greater Syria, encompassing — in
addition to Trans-Jordan and Iraq, which were already ruled by the Hashemite
dynasty — also part of Palestine and the whole of Syria and Lebanon.
Recent research
(mainly by Flapan`s fellow MAPAMnik, the historian Yoram Nimrod) has brought to
light documents showing that in the months following November 1947 the other
neighbouring Arab states, Egypt and Syria, were trying behind the scenes to
reach a peaceful settlement with the Zionist leadership. Despite their extreme
warlike rhetoric — for the consumption of the Arab masses — they
had no wish to fight against the emergent Zionist state, and little faith in
their ability to win such a war.
Moreover, what
worried them was not so much the creation of a Jewish state, but `Abdallah`s
schemes for a Greater Syria. They therefore sought a peaceful settlement with
the Zionist leadership, based on the creation of an independent Palestinian
state, as provided by the UN Partition Resolution. On the other hand, they made
it clear that if a war were to break out, they would have to step in, if only
in order not to leave the field entirely to `Abdallah.
David Ben-Gurion
and the rest of the Zionist leadership were faced with a choice between the
possibility of a peaceful settlement based on accepting the creation of a
Palestinian Arab state, and a war in which, as pre-arranged with `Abdallah, the
creation of a Palestinian state would be prevented. Ben-Gurion showed no
hesitation in choosing the latter option.
Why were Zionist
leaders ready to go to such great lengths to prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian Arab state and to promote the alternative Hashemite option? Surely,
the fact that `Abdallah was actually in their pay — recently
de-classified documents show that he was receiving a small `subsidy` from the
Jewish Agency (Flapan mentions this, in passing, on p. 128) — is not sufficient
to explain their apparently bizarre choice.
This question is
all the more important, because implacable opposition to the creation of a
sovereign Palestinian state — in any piece of land west of the Jordan
river — is one of the fundamental constants in mainstream Zionist
politics. It is just as much a cornerstone of Israeli policy today as it was
more than forty years ago.
Since Flapan
never quite spells out a clear-cut answer to this important question, I feel
duty-bound to do it for him. Zionist opposition to the creation of a sovereign
Palestinian Arab state, however small and emasculated, is not based on
short-term military considerations but on long-term historical ones, which
concern the very nature of the Zionist claim over Eretz Yisrael (the Land of
Israel, aka Palestine). This claim is absolutely exclusive and cannot be
reconciled with the recognition of Palestinian Arab national rights over, or
even in, the Holy Land.
For unavoidable
reasons of realpolitik Zionists may agree to concede sovereignty over some part
of Palestine to an external power, such as Jordan. Such a concession is,
however, purely pragmatic and temporary, and therefore in principle reversible.
Israel always
reserves the right to `liberate` such conceded territories as the need or the ability
to do so arises. But to allow the establishment within Palestine of a sovereign
national entity of the indigenous people — that would undermine the whole
self-justification and legitimation of the Zionist enterprise. A concession of
this kind would be historically irreversible.
Moreover, though
a Palestinian state may initially be small and weak, there is no telling what
changes might take place in the more distant future. The balance of forces, and
hence the borders, between that state and Israel — like any balance of
forces and any border — will be subject to the vicissitudes of future
history. After all, had Israel itself not started from small and modest
beginnings, only to expand over the whole of cisjordanian Palestine and the Syrian
Golan Heights?
It is of course
not surprising that Flapan never completely exposes the deep roots of Zionist
policy. After all, he remained a Zionist — albeit a heterodox one,
tormented by doubts — to his dying day. Rather, what demands explanation
is why a Zionist such as Flapan should be so keen to demolish the myths of
Zionism and expose its historical culpability.
The answer is
that Flapan (like the historian Yoram Nimrod and the late Arabist, Aharon
Cohen) belongs to a small group of Zionists — a minority even within his
own party, MAPAM — who genuinely believe that it was possible to achieve
the aims of Zionism without provoking irreconcilable conflict with the
indigenous Palestinian Arab people, but rather by their consent and in
cooperation with them. In order to establish this thesis, he is motivated to
expose the lies of the mainstream Zionist leaders, who hypocritically claim
that they acted as they did because the wicked aggressiveness of the
Palestinians (and the rest of the Arabs) never left them any choice. He must
show that, on the contrary, momentous policy decisions of the Zionist
leadership were not imposed from the outside, by the other side`s actions, but
were a matter of choice.
Personally, I
think that Flapan`s basic thesis is untenable. I cannot see how Zionism, a
colonizatory project, could possibly achieve its aims without violating the
individual and national rights of the indigenous people of Palestine. I do not
believe in the possibility of benign colonialism. True, Ben-Gurion and the other
mainstream Zionist leaders often did have a choice. But in choosing as they did
they acted under the inner compulsion of the logic of Zionism.
But whatever
Flapan`s motivation, and irrespective of what one may think of his underlying
thesis, he deserves our deep gratitude for exposing so much of the truth, with
very few and relatively trivial deviations from absolute honesty.(1)
The readability
of the narrative and the generally high technical standard of the book`s
presentation (2) make it highly recommendable — indeed, required reading
— to anyone seriously interested in the Middle East.
* * *
Benny Morris is
a historian (as well as being diplomatic correspondent for the Jerusalem Post)
and his book is a scholarly work. Eschewing polemics, it comes close to being
exhaustive as a factual account of the creation of the Palestinian refugee
problem.
On the whole,
Morris`s research confirms the less detailed account presented in the third
chapter of Flapan`s book.
The claim, often
made by Zionist propaganda, that the Palestinian refugees fled at the
instigation of the Arab leadership, which therefore bears the responsibility
for their flight and plight, has long been dismissed by all serious scholars,
simply because there is not a shred of evidence for it.
What about the
counter-claim of anti-Zionist propaganda, that the refugees were expelled by
the Israelis according to a previously worked-out plan?
Well, the
picture that emerges from both books — there is no major factual
disagreement between them — can be stated briefly as follows.
During the 1930s
and 1940s, the mainstream Zionist leadership reached a virtual consensus in
favour of `transferring` the bulk of the Palestinian Arab people away from
their homeland. Various projects for achieving this were formulated and
discussed in secret. It was hoped that the `transfer` might be achieved through
political agreement with the Arab states and Britain.
(Indeed, The
British Labour Party, which came to office in 1945, actually adopted in its
conference of that year a resolution in favour of the `transfer` idea!)
However, at the
end of November 1947, when hostilities started between the Arab and Jewish
populations of Palestine, the Zionist leadership did not have anything that
might be called an actual plan for exploiting the specific conditions of war
for the implementation of the `transfer`. The reason for this seems to be that
it simply did not occur to the Zionist leaders that such a thing was
technically or politically feasible.
During the early
months of the war, the growing feeling of insecurity, and the virtual collapse
of proper administration in the Arab urban centres along the coastal plain, led
to the spontaneous flight of middle-class urban Arab families, who sought
shelter in parts of Palestine that were allocated to the proposed Palestinian
Arab state, or in neighbouring Arab countries. Gradually, this developed into
something of a stampede, involving part of the rural population as well.
By the spring of
1948, it had dawned on the political and military leaders of the nascent
Zionist state that a demographically `pure` Jewish state was a realistic
possibility, if only the Palestinians` flight, which had began spontaneously,
would be positively `encouraged` and the refugees prevented from returning to
their homes. This is what these leaders proceeded to do. The shark had smelt
blood in the water.
Even then, no
formal resolution to expel the Palestinians was adopted by the official Zionist
decision-making bodies, nor is there evidence of a detailed overall plan for
the implementation of the forced transfer of population. Indeed, such a
resolution and detailed plan were hardly necessary. It was enough that the
small circle of military and political leaders around Ben-Gurion, `the real
decision-makers`, had a general `design … to reduce the number of Arabs in the
Jewish state to a minimum, and to make use of their lands, properties and
habitats to absorb the masses of Jewish immigrants.` (Flapan, pp. 88-9) Local
military commanders were not given specific orders in writing, but were made
aware of the general design, and were relied upon to do their bit in
implementing it. For the most part (with few exception) they were willing to do
what was expected of them. The majority of Palestinians in areas under Israeli
control were terrorized into flight, and in many cases physically driven across
the lines.
Benny Morris is
not exactly a conformist. In fact, last year he spent some time in prison for
refusing to do his military reserve service in the occupied territories. But,
unlike Flapan, he does not express great moral outrage at the grand crimes of
Zionism.
He is sparing in
expressions of value-judgement; and when he does make such a judgment, he bends
over backwards to argue in mitigation of those crimes. Unlike Flapan, he does
not seem to believe that Zionism could have acted in an essentially different
way, and as a Zionist he feels obliged to plead that external circumstances
left no other choice.(3) Also, the narrow scope of his book, dealing with the
refugee question alone, allows him to accept at face value most of the myths
demolished by Flapan`s book.
Despite this
grave shortcoming, Morris`s book is an invaluable compilation of factual
material on the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem.
MOSHE MACHOVER
London
1. Among his
rare deviations is the cosmetic way in which he presents the policies of his
own party, MAPAM, and its precursor, Hashomer Hatza`ir (see p. 20). Also, in
translating Hebrew words he sometimes tones down their harshness, perhaps
unconsciously. Thus on p. 114 he refers to the committee set up by Ben-Gurion
to coordinate the eviction of the Palestinians as the `Committee for Removal
and Expulsion`. The Hebrew word that he translates as `removal` is `aqirah,
which actually means not simply removal but uprooting.
2. Two
technical faults must however be pointed out. First, the transcription of
Hebrew and Arabic names is a bit erratic, and sometimes simply wrong. Second,
in Maps 2 to 6 the Litani river is inexplicably shown as flowing along the
Israeli- Lebanese border, whereas in fact it is about 20 miles further north.
3. This
impression is confirmed in an interview he granted to the Tel-Aviv newspaper Ha
`ir, 21 October 1988.
VB