History of failed peace talks
In the 40
years since the Middle East war of June 1967, there have been many peace plans
and many negotiations.
Some of these
have been successful, including those between Egypt and Israel and Israel and
Jordan, but a settlement has still not been reached in the core conflict, the
dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians.
The BBC News
website's Paul Reynolds looks at the main peace proposals since 1967 and what
happened to them.
SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, 1967
This was
passed on 22 November 1967 and embodies the principle that has guided most of
the subsequent peace plans - the exchange of land for peace.
The resolution
called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict", and "respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".
The resolution
is famous for the imprecision, in English, of its central phase concerning an
Israeli withdrawal - it says simply "from territories".
OBSTACLES TO PEACE
The Israelis
said this did not necessarily mean all territories, but Arab negotiators argued
that it did.
It was written
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, under which Security Council resolutions
are recommendations, not under Chapter VII, which means they are orders. Many
peace proposals refer to 242.
Resolution 338
is usually linked to it. This called for a ceasefire in the war of October 1973
and urged the implementation of 242 "in all its parts".
CAMP DAVID
ACCORDS, 1978
There were
several peace plans following the 1967 war, including one by Yigal Allon, an
Israeli general who proposed that Israel give back to Jordan the highlands of
the West Bank while retaining a defensive line along the Jordan valley.
However,
nothing happened until after the war in October 1973, during which Egyptian
forces crossed the Suez Canal. There followed a new mood for peace, at least
between Israel and Egypt, as was shown by a historic visit to Jerusalem by the
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in November 1977.
US President
Jimmy Carter capitalised on the new mood and invited President Sadat and the
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin for talks at the presidential retreat at
Camp David near Washington.
The talks
lasted for 12 days and resulted in two agreements.
The first was
called A Framework for Peace in the Middle East. It laid down principles for
peace, expanding on resolution 242, set out what it hoped was a way of
resolving what it called the "Palestinian problem", agreed that there
should be a treaty between Egypt and Israel and called for other treaties
between Israel and its neighbours.
The weakness
of the first agreement was the section on the Palestinians. The plan aimed to
set up a "self-governing authority" in the West Bank and Gaza,
leading to eventual "final status" talks, but the Palestinians were
not party to the agreement.
The second
accord was the framework for the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This
followed in 1979, after an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
This was the
first recognition of Israel as a state by a major Arab country. They probably
stand as the most successful negotiations in the whole peace process.
The treaty has
lasted, and it substantially strengthened Israel's position. However the peace
between Egypt and Israel has not been warm. President Sadat was himself later
assassinated.
THE MADRID
CONFERENCE, 1991
This conference,
co-sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union, was designed to follow up the
Egypt-Israel treaty by encouraging other Arab countries to sign their own
agreements with Israel.
Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria were invited as well as Israel and Egypt. The Palestinians
were also represented, but as part of a joint delegation with Jordan and not by
Yasser Arafat or other leading figures in the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO), to whom the Israelis objected.
The conference
eventually led to a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994, but this
probably would have happened anyway.
The symbolism
of Arab countries other than Egypt openly negotiating with Israel was probably
the main achievement of the Madrid conference. The Palestinian track soon gave
way to secret talks that led to the Oslo agreement.
ISRAELI-SYRIAN
TALKS
After the
Madrid conference in 1991, direct talks began between Israel and Syria. Syria's
main demand was for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the
plateau overlooking the Sea of Galilee that Israel had captured in 1967.
Israel
responded that it was prepared to negotiate a withdrawal but the extent and
timing of that withdrawal depended on Syria agreeing to a peace treaty and to
an extended period of normalisation of relations first. Any agreement would
also have to be accepted in a referendum in Israel.
Syria claims
that in talks in 1995, the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin agreed to
a total pullback. However, the Israelis say this was only a theoretical
acceptance and that it depended on the full normalisation of relations, a
condition that Syria, it claims, did not accept.
An unofficial
agreement between Israeli and Syrian private citizens was reported to have been
reached in 2006 but this has not led to talks between the two governments.
Israeli talks
with Lebanon took place after Madrid but have stalled, complicated by border
disputes and, more recently, last year's war between Israel and Hezbollah. Any
Israeli treaty with Lebanon is expected to have to wait until after one with
Syria, given Syria's influence in Lebanon.
OSLO
AGREEMENT, 1993
The Oslo
negotiations tried to tackle the missing element of all previous talks - a
direct agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, represented by the PLO.
Its importance
was that there was finally mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO.
The talks took
place in secret under Norwegian auspices and the agreement was signed on the
White House lawn on 13 September 1993, witnessed by President Bill Clinton.
WHITE HOUSE HANDSHAKE
The PLO leader
Yasser Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands.
The agreement
was that Israeli troops would withdraw in stages from the West Bank and Gaza,
that a "Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority" would be set up
for a five-year transitional period, leading to a permanent settlement based on
resolutions 242 and 338.
The agreement
spoke of putting "an end to decades of confrontation and conflict"
and of each side recognising "their mutual legitimate and political rights".
Therefore,
though not stated explicitly in the text, the implication was that a state of
Palestine would one day be set up alongside Israel.
There was an
exchange of letters in which Yasser Arafat stated: "The PLO recognises the
right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security." Yitzhak
Rabin said: "The Government of Israel has decided to recognise the PLO as
the representative of the Palestinian people."
Hamas and
other Palestinian rejectionist groups did not accept Oslo and launched suicide
bomb attacks on Israelis. There was opposition within Israel from settler-led
groups. Oslo was only partially implemented.
CAMP DAVID,
2000
Various
attempts were made (including at Taba in 1995, the Wye River in 1998 and Sharm
el-Sheikh in 1999) to speed up the withdrawal and self-government provisions of
Oslo.
Then in 2000,
President Bill Clinton sought to address the final status issues - including
borders, Jerusalem and refugees - that Oslo had left on one side for later
negotiation.
The talks took
place in July between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat.
There was no
agreement. However, the negotiations were more detailed than ever before.
The basic
problem was that the maximum Israel offered was less than the minimum the
Palestinians could accept.
Israel offered
the Gaza Strip, a large part of the West Bank, plus extra land from the Negev
desert, while keeping major settlement blocks and most of East Jerusalem. It
proposed Islamic guardianship of key sites in the Old City of Jerusalem and
contributions to a fund for Palestinian refugees.
The
Palestinians wanted to start with a reversion to the lines of 1967, offered the
Israelis rights over the Jewish quarter of the Old City and wanted recognition
of the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees.
The failure at
Camp David was followed by a renewal of the Palestinian uprising or intifada.
TABA, 2001
Although he
was about to leave office, Bill Clinton refused to give up and he presented a
"bridging proposal" which set up further talks in Washington and
Cairo and then Taba in Egypt.
These talks
were not at the top level, but differences were narrowed without being
overcome. There was more flexibility on territory and it was reported by EU
observers that Israeli negotiators accepted the concept of East Jerusalem being
the capital of a Palestinian state. A statement afterwards said that "it
proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues".
The Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak, fighting an election campaign, said that
"nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon " and said
that he could not commit a subsequent government to what he called the
"ideas" coming out of the talks. With the election of Ariel Sharon in
February 2001, time ran out.
SAUDI PEACE
PLAN, 2002
After the
failure of bilateral talks and the resumption of conflict, the Saudi peace plan
presented at an Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002 went back to a multilateral
approach and in particular signalled a desire by the Arab world as a whole to put
an end to this dispute.
Under the
plan, Israel would withdraw to the lines of June 1967, a Palestinian state
would be set up in the West Bank and Gaza and there would be a "just
solution" of the refugee issue. In return, Arab countries would recognise
Israel.
The plan was
re-endorsed by another Arab summit in Riyadh in 2007.
Its strength
is the support given by Arab countries to a two-state solution. Its weakness is
that the parties have to negotiate the same issues on which they have failed so
far.
ROAD MAP,
2003
The road map
is a plan drawn up by the "Quartet" - the United States, Russia, the
European Union and the United Nations. It does not lay down the details of a
final settlement, but suggests how a settlement might be approached.
It followed
efforts made by US Senator George Mitchell to get the peace process back on
track in 2001.
The plan was
preceded by an important statement in June 2002 by President George W Bush who
became the first US president to call for a Palestinian state. The road map tries
to lay down conditions for its achievement.
It proposed a
phased timetable, putting the establishment of security before a final
settlement. It is designed to create confidence, leading to final status talks.
• Phase 1:
Both sides would issue statements supporting the two-state solution, the
Palestinians would end violence, act against "all those engaged in
terror", draw up a constitution, hold elections and the Israelis would
stop settlement activities and act with military restraint
• Phase 2:
Would see the creation, at an international conference, of a Palestinian state
with "provisional borders"
• Phase 3:
Final agreement talks.
The road map
has not been implemented. Its timetable called for the final agreement to be
reached in 2005. It has been overtaken by events.
GENEVA
ACCORD, 2003
While official
efforts foundered, an informal agreement was announced in December 2003 by
Israeli and Palestinian figures - Yossi Beilin, one of the architects of Oslo,
on the Israeli side, and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed
Rabbo on the other.
It reverses
the concept of the Road Map, in which the growth of security and confidence
precede a political agreement and puts the agreement first, which is then
designed to produce security and peace.
Its main
compromise is that the Palestinians effectively give up their "right of
return" in exchange for almost the whole of the West Bank, though there
could be a token return by a few. Israel would give up some major settlements
such as Ariel, but keep others closer to the border, with swaps of land in
Israel for any taken in the West Bank.
Palestinians
would have the right to have their capital in East Jerusalem, though with
Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall in the Old City. The Geneva agreement
has no official status.
Another
unofficial agreeement was one drawn up by a former head of the Israeli Shin Bet
internal security service Ami Ayalon and a former PLO representative in
Jerusalem Sari Nusseibeh. This envisaged a return to the 1967 lines, an open
city of Jerusalem and an end to the Palestinian claim to a right of return to
former homes.
Paul.Reynolds-INTERNET@bbc.co.uk© BBC MMVIII Published: 2007/11/26
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