Israeli & Syrian Citizens' Plan to Return the Golan Heights to Syrian Control as a Demilitarized Park, with Israelis' Access, and With Broad Buffer Zones in Israel and Syria. 1/16-17/07:
1. Israeli, Syrian Representatives Reach Secret Understandings, by Akiva Eldar, with text and maps. Haaretz 1-16-07
2. Help, they want peace. Commentary by Uzi Benziman. Haaretz. 1-17-07
3. Israeli and Syrian Citizens Wrote Plan for Returning Golan Heights by Greg Myre. NYTimes. 1-17-07
4. Syrians and Israelis 'held talks.' BBC News. 1-16-07
1. Israeli,
Syrian Representatives Reach Secret Understandings
By Akiva Eldar
Haaretz, Israel
Tuesday 16 January 2007Also see below:
Full Text of Document Drafted During Secret Talks
In a series of secret meetings in Europe between September 2004 and July 2006, Syrians and Israelis formulated understandings for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. The main points of the understandings are as follows:
o An agreement of principles will be signed between the two countries, and following the fulfillment of all commitments, a peace agreement will be signed.
o As part of the agreement on principles, Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights to the lines of 4 June, 1967. The timetable for the withdrawal remained open: Syria demanded the pullout be carried out over a five-year period, while Israel asked for the withdrawal to be spread out over 15 years.
o At the buffer zone, along Lake Kinneret, a park will be set up for joint use by Israelis and Syrians. The park will cover a significant portion of the Golan Heights. Israelis will be free to access the park and their presence will not be dependent on Syrian approval.
o Israel will retain control over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and Lake Kinneret.
o The border area will be demilitarized along a 1:4 ratio (in terms of territory) in Israel's favor.
o According to the terms, Syria will also agree to end its support for Hezbollah and Hamas and will distance itself from Iran.
o Map of territorial arrangements:The document is described as a "non-paper," a document of understandings that is not signed and lacks legal standing - its nature is political. It was prepared in August 2005 and has been updated during a number of meetings in Europe.
The meetings were carried out with the knowledge of senior officials in the government of former prime minister Ariel Sharon. The last meeting took place during last summer's war in Lebanon. Government officials received updates on the meetings via the European mediator and also through Dr. Alon Liel, a former director general at the Foreign Ministry, who took part in all the meetings.
The European mediator and the Syrian representative in the discussions held eight separate meetings with senior Syrian officials, including Vice President Farouk Shara, Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, and a Syrian intelligence officer with the rank of "general."
The contacts ended after the Syrians demanded an end to meetings on an unofficial level and called for a secret meeting at the level of deputy minister, on the Syrian side, with an Israeli official at the rank of a ministry's director general, including the participation of a senior American official. Israel did not agree to this Syrian request.
The Syrian representative in the talks, Ibrahim (Abe) Suleiman, an American citizen, had visited Jerusalem and delivered a message to senior officials at the Foreign Ministry regarding the Syrian wish for an agreement with Israel. The Syrians also asked for help in improving their relations with the United States, and particularly in lifting the American embargo on Syria.
For his part, the European mediator stressed that the Syrian leadership is concerned that the loss of petroleum revenues will lead to an economic crash in the country and could consequently undermine the stability of the Assad regime.
According to Geoffrey Aronson, an American from the Washington-based Foundation for Middle East Peace, who was involved in the talks, an agreement under American auspices would call for Syria to ensure that Hezbollah would limit itself to being solely a political party.
He also told Haaretz that Khaled Meshal, Hamas' political bureau chief, based in Damascus, would have to leave the Syrian capital.
Syria would also exercise its influence for a solution to the conflict in Iraq, through an agreement between Shi'a leader Muqtada Sadr and the Sunni leadership, and in addition, it would contribute to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the refugee problem.
Aronson said the idea of a park on the Golan Heights allows for the Syrian demand that Israel pull back to the June 4 border, on the one hand, while on the other hand, the park eliminates Israeli concerns that Syrians will have access to the water sources of Lake Kinneret.
"This was a serious and honest effort to find creative solutions to practical problems that prevented an agreement from being reached during Barak's [tenure as prime minister] and to create an atmosphere of building confidence between the two sides," he said.
It also emerged that one of the Syrian messages to Israel had to do with the ties between Damascus and Tehran. In the message, the Alawi regime - the Assad family being members of the Alawi minority - asserts that it considers itself to be an integral part of the Sunni world and that it objects to the Shi'a theocratic regime, and is particularly opposed to Iran's policy in Iraq. A senior Syrian official stressed that a peace agreement with Israel will enable Syria to distance itself from Iran.
Liel refused to divulge details about the meetings but confirmed that they had taken place. He added that meetings on an unofficial level have been a fairly common phenomenon during the past decade.
"We insisted on making the existence of meetings known to the relevant parties," Liel said. "Nonetheless, there was no official Israeli connection to the content of the talks and to the ideas that were raised during the meetings."
Prior to these meetings, Liel was involved in an effort to further secret talks between Syria and Israel with the aid of Turkish mediation - following a request for assistance President Assad had made to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
That attempt failed following Israel's refusal to hold talks on an official level - and a Syrian refusal to restrict the talks to an "academic level," similar to the framework of the talks that had preceded the Oslo accords.
There was no initial formal response from the Prime Minister's Office after the story broke early on Tuesday. But the Israel Radio quoted unnamed senior Israeli officials as stating that Israel is not holding contacts with Syria.
Full Text of Document Drafted During Secret Talks
By Akiva Eldar
Haaretz, Israel
Tuesday 16 January 2007
Draft 4
August 29, 2004
Preamble
The objective of this effort is
to establish normal, peaceful relations between the governments
and peoples of Israel and Syria, and to sign a treaty of peace
attesting to this achievement. The treaty will resolve the four
"pillars" at the core of negotiations: security, water,
normalization, and borders. There is be no agreement on any single
one of these issues unless and until all of these issues are resolved.
I. Sovereignty
1. Syrian sovereignty, based upon the June 4, 1967 line in
the Golan Heights, is acknowledged by Israel. The mutually agreed
upon border will be determined by both parties (and guaranteed
by the U.S. and the UN)
II. Framework Agreement, Implementation, and the End to the
State of Belligerency
A "Framework Agreement" will address the issues
of security (including early warning), water, normalization, and
borders. Negotiations to reach such an agreement should proceed
as expeditiously.
1. The state of belligerency between the parties will cease upon
signature of a framework agreement between the parties, and will
include the cessation of hostile actions by each party against
the other.
2. Application of Syrian sovereignty in the Golan Heights, the
establishment of normal, bilateral diplomatic relations, and the
implementation of relevant provisions related to water and security
will commence as soon as possible after the conclusion of a Framework
Agreement but no later than the signing of a treaty of peace.
3. Implementation of the Israeli withdrawal to the mutually agreed
border will occur during a period (the exact time frame to be
mutually agreed) from signature of the Framework Agreement.
III. Peace Treaty
1. Satisfactory implementation of provisions and obligations
established in the Framework Agreement will result in the signing
of a peace treaty between the parties.
IV. Security
1. Demilitarized zones will be established in the areas of
the Golan Heights that Israeli forces will vacate.
2. No military forces, armaments, weapons systems, or military
infrastructure will be introduced into the demilitarized zones.
Only a limited civil police presence will be deployed in the areas.
3. Both parties agree not to fly over demilitarized zones without
a special arrangement.
4. The establishment of an early warning system includes a ground
station on Mt. Hermon/Jabal as-Sheikh operated by the United States.
5. A monitoring and inspection and verification mechanism will
be established to monitor and supervise the security agreements.
6. Direct liaison between the parties will be established in order
to: Create a direct, real time communication capability on security
issues in order to minimize friction along the international border;
Help to prevent errors and misunderstandings between the parties.
7. Zones of reduced military forces will be established in Israel
west of the international border with Syria and in Syria east
of the Golan Heights. The respective depth of these zones (as
measured in kilometers) between Israel and Syria will be according
to a ratio of 1:4.
8. The Parties will cooperate in fighting local and international
terrorism of all kinds.
9. The Parties will work together for a stable and safe Middle
East, including the solution of regional problems related to the
Palestinians, Lebanese, and Iran.
V. Water
1. Israel will control the use and disposition of the water
in the Upper Jordan River and Lake Tiberias.
2. Syria will not interrupt or obstruct natural flow of water
in either quality or quantity in the Upper Jordan River, its tributaries,
and Lake Tiberias.
3. Syrian use of the waters of the upper Jordan River, its tributaries,
and Lake Tiberias for residential and fishing purposes is recognized
and guaranteed.
VI. Park
1. In order to safeguard the water resources of the Jordan
River basin, Syrian territory east of the mutually agreed border
will be designated as a Park open to all and administered by Syria.
The Park is to be established in the Golan Heights upon completion
of the Israeli withdrawal and application of Syrian sovereignty
in accordance with the treaty of peace. The park will extend from
the agreed upon border eastward to a line to be determined by
mutual agreement.
2. Park characteristics:
o Park is open for tourism.
o Park will be policed by Syrian park service personnel.
o The park will be free of permanent residents except for conservation and law enforcement personnel.
o No visa will be required for entry into park [from Israeli territory].
o Syrians will issue onsite official entry permit for a nominal fee.
o Visitors wishing to enter other Syrian territory east of the Park must have a proper visa and transit Syrian controls on park's eastern perimeter.
o Entry to park is valid for one day during daylight hours.
End
2. Syrians and Israelis 'held talks'
The Israelis and Syrians have held secret talks about a peace deal, a former Israeli diplomat has said. Dr Alon Liel said the meetings were arranged in a private capacity, and Israeli sources said the talks were not officially sanctioned by Israel.
Israel's Haaretz daily says a series of agreements were reached, including an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in 1967. But the talks apparently collapsed with Israel's war in Lebanon last year. According to the paper, Israeli and Syrian representatives met secretly in Europe several times between September 2004 and July 2006. In exchange for a full Israeli pull-out from Golan Heights, captured in the Six Day War 30 years ago, Syria would end support for anti-Israel militant groups.
Unofficial talks
But Dr Liel stressed to the BBC that the representatives were
operating privately and were not aiming at a final agreement,
but a framework.
While Israel says that non-government representatives from the two countries may have met, Syria denies any secret meetings took place.
Official peace talks between Syria and Israel
broke down six years ago. But last October, Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad said Damascus would be prepared to hold talks with Israel.
He acknowledged Syria and Israel could live side-by-side in peace
accepting each other's existence.
Israel's deputy prime minister Shimon Peres also said Syrian representatives
would be welcome to come to Jerusalem for talks.
But Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert distanced himself from Mr Peres's remarks. The invitation, his spokesman said, was not issued on his behalf. Israel and Syria have been officially in a state of war ever since Israel was established nearly 60 years ago.
Since 1967, Israel has occupied a part of Syrian territory, the strategically important Golan Heights, overlooking the Sea of Galilee.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/6267117.stm
Published: 2007/01/16 12:57:23 GMT
3. Help, they want peace
by Uzi Benziman Haaretz 17 Jan 07
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/814346.html>
It is enough to observe the panicked responses in Jerusalem to the report by Akiva Eldar (1) yesterday in Haaretz on the outlines of an agreement between Israel and Syria cobbled together in unofficial talks, to feel yet again that generations of governments of Israel, including the present one, are responsible in no small way for prolonging the Israeli-Arab conflict. Unlike the first 30 years of the state's existence, when the Arab world refused to recognize Israel, its neighbors have gradually come to terms with the reality starting in 1977. And since then, the Arab world has also started to bear responsibility, at least partially, for fanning the embers of the conflict.
Olmert's bureau raced yesterday to deny any connection, even a passive one, to the talks that took place in Europe on the Israel-Syrian conflict.
Associates of Ariel Sharon, who, according to the report, was aware of the secret negotiations, did the same. The insulted added their voices to the deniers: A senior minister told Israel Radio that he is privy to all secret diplomatic moves and if he was not party to this, then there was nothing to be party to. And MK Yuval Steinitz said that he had spoken at the time with Sharon, who told him he ruled out any relationship with the present Syrian regime because of its ties to terror. A united front of deniers emerged, as if on command, to clarify that the Israeli government was not involved nor is it tainted by an attempt to come to an arrangement with Bashar Assad.
This is a ludicrous spectacle, the irony of which fades in light of its depressing significance: Israel's leaders are trying hard to prove to its citizens that they are not involved in a move to end 60 years of hostility with its Syrian neighbor. These leaders are kowtowing to residents of the Golan Heights, the settlers and the American government. The desire to mollify them seems to be the government's top priority; otherwise, it is impossible to understand the complete and utter denial of the efforts reported by Eldar. It is as if Olmert decided that a confession on his part to any involvement in a channel of communication with Assad is politically lethal.
The contours of the reported arrangement should be studied and discussed widely by the public. For the first time in six years the public is being presented with an alternative to the hostile situation with Syria. Whether the understandings were purely hypothetical, stemming from non-binding talks among a few naive individuals, or whether the government of Sharon and Olmert had been informed of them, they are an important matter that should be addressed, not turned away from. A high barrier of fear, enmity, and substantive disagreements and prejudices separates Israel and Syria. These component parts of the conflict require treatment, clarification and compromise; this may or may not be attainable, and that is the very purpose of negotiations. The Israeli public has the right to demand that its government try to reach an agreement with Damascus.
Preserving the status quo will necessarily lead to armed conflict. The assumption that Syria will forever accept the occupation of the Golan is an illusion that will be shattered some day in a bloody war. Israel's ability to stand strong, on which its deterrence effect is based, can ensure the state's existence only when it is a peace-seeker; but this ability atrophies when its entire purpose is to perpetuate the occupation. Despite differences in regimes and political culture, Israel has managed to establish peaceful relations with Egypt and Jordan; therefore, it should not cling to these difference to get out of negotiations with Syria. Official Israel is behaving this way to avoid paying the price of peace - giving up the Golan.
But in unofficial Israel there is a substantial public that prefers peace over territories.
Uzi Benziman is a diplomatic and political columnist for Ha'aretz. He has been covering Israeli politics and diplomacy for four decades.
Footnotes:
(1)
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/813814.html>
4. Israeli and Syrian
Citizens Wrote Plan for Returning Golan Heights
By GREG MYRE
JERUSALEM, Jan. 16 - Prominent private citizens from Israel and Syria drafted a document in secret, unofficial talks that calls for returning the Golan Heights to Syria and offers a possible outline for peace negotiations, one of the participants said Tuesday.
However, the Israeli and Syrian governments dismissed the document, which was first described Tuesday in the Israeli daily Haaretz. They said they were not involved in the talks, which included sessions from September 2004 to July 2006 at undisclosed sites in Europe.
"No one in the government was involved in this matter," Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel said. "It was a private initiative." In Syria, Bushra Kanafani, a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, told the Arab satellite network Al Jazeera that the Israeli report was "mere fabrication and a test balloon." Israel and Syria last held formal peace talks in 2000, when they appeared close to a deal to return most or all of the Golan Heights to Syria. But the negotiations broke down, and the two countries routinely trade recriminations.
Israel captured the territory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and later annexed it. Today, about 20,000 Israelis live in the Golan Heights, a sparsely populated region that includes farms, vineyards and tourist sites. It is considered to have strategic military value, rising far above both northern Israel and southern Syria.
With formal diplomatic efforts stalled in 2004, Alon Liel, a former director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, quietly began unofficial talks with Ibrahim Suleiman, a well-connected Syrian businessman who has been living near Washington.
Turkey helped to arrange the initial contacts, and an unidentified European mediator was involved in the talks throughout, Haaretz reported.
The document, written last summer, calls for Syria to regain the Golan Heights based on the border that existed before the 1967 war. While no timetable was set for an Israeli withdrawal, Haaretz reported that the two sides discussed 5 to 15 years.
The heights, which overlook much of northern Israel, would be demilitarized except for a limited police presence, the document says. A park would be established in the Golan Heights, and Israelis would be allowed to visit, without a visa, in daylight hours, the document says.
It says Israel would maintain water rights on the upper Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee.
The two countries would also establish normal diplomatic relations.
The talks and the document they produced resemble the Geneva Initiative of 2003, in which former Israeli and Palestinian government officials, acting on their own, wrote a symbolic political agreement. Neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian government accepted it. Mr. Liel emphasized that he had acted entirely in a private capacity. "There was no government involvement from the Israeli side," he said by telephone.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company